Monday, September 18, 2017
Consensus building in the Age of Trump: Strategies for the ADR Field
What’s it like in The Age of Trump?
What’s special about the Age
of Trump? I would point to two things.
First, our political leaders (not just the President) no longer feel an
obligation to represent all the people in the district or state that elected
them. Now, they only feel accountable to their “base.” This is a relatively new
occurrence (not just in the United States, but in other democracies as well). It used to be that after politicians were
elected they felt some obligation to represent the interests of all the people
in their district or state. As a result,
we now have districts or states (or countries!) where 49.9% of the electorate
has no representation. This makes them
feel angry, anxious and defense. It also
makes them feel combative.
The second thing that has
changed, and it is related to the first, is that many elected and appointed
officials don’t care what evidence or
arguments anyone on “the other side” presents. They won’t allow
themselves to be convinced by what anyone outside their base has to say. This
means that those in control of the levers of power can pursue whatever agenda they
choose, without having to explain or justify their actions in a manner that “an
independent observer” would agree is reasonable. This adds to the outrage, and
even desperation, of those who feel shut out and unrepresented. They are especially angry that scientific
evidence can be ignored entirely.
So, in the Age of Trump, many
people who have not felt powerless before feel powerless now. They are befuddled by the changes that have
occurred in the rules of the game. In the past, they assumed (maybe somewhat
naively) that their elected leaders would choose the common good over narrow
partisan interests; and, they counted on being able to advocate for what they
believe by presenting credible evidence. Now they assume these things won’t
happen.
Special challenges for Consensus Builders and other
ADR professionals
ADR professionals operate in
ways that are intended to ensure fairness – to ensure that all voices are heard
and all interests are taken into account when disagreements arise. In a decision-making or governance system that
rejects the idea that the interests of all groups matter, ADR professionals are
not quite sure what part they are supposed to play. The reason those of us in the ADR field have worked
hard to add facilitation, mediation and arbitration to public and private
efforts to deal with differences, is to enhance the fairness, efficiency,
stability and wisdom of decisions that must be made. In the judicial, executive
and legislative branches, at every level of government, we have spent decades
demonstrating that adding a professional neutral can, in fact, save time, save
money and produce better outcomes (and give stakeholders greater control over
what happens to them). In the Age of
Trump, ADR professionals now wonder how they can do their job if some of the
parties don’t care what the interests of the other parties are; or, some
parties feel no obligation to listen to or present credible evidence to support
their claims. Many ADR professionals are
extremely upset about these changes. Some are so upset they feel compelled to
invest their personal time in political efforts to put things back the way they
were. When this involves advocacy, though – even when the professionals
involved are operating as private citizens -- it threatens our most important professional
asset – our neutrality.
Neutrality is central to the value
we add as ADR professionals. Our neutrality allows us to earn the trust of all
sides in any dispute. It also means we
can operate in the interstices between the parties and, in so doing, carry
messages and provide cover for parties to come together without appearing to be
weak. My contention is that many ADR professionals are so upset by what is
happening in the Age of Trump that they are ready to risk their perceived
neutrality. While I understand their
motives, I am convinced this would be a disaster for the profession.
Increasing demand for ADR assistance in periods of
heightened conflict
.
The Age of Trump has
certainly generated new conflicts of various kinds. When everyone is escalating their efforts on
behalf of their own point-of-view, and more people feel entitled to act in the
own interests regardless of the interests of “the other side,” there ought to
be increasing demand for our services. So,
in these times, we ought to be able to make a greater contribution (in part
because no one else is offering to reconcile those in conflict or pursue problem-solving
strategies in spite of the conflicts that exist). To succeed in the current context, however,
will require several things:
1.
First, we have to
remind our potential clients that our goal is not to stamp out conflict. Rather, if they find themselves stalemated
and unable to take unilateral action, we can help them find agreeable ways
forward in which no one has to give in.
2.
Second, if well
managed, conflict can lead to produce change. Conflict is not a bad thing. As others have noted, it is the engine of
change. We can help manage conflict in a
constructive way.
3.
Third, the fact
that parties are inclined to express their interests and concerns with more
passion in the Age of Trump, is not a problem for us. In some ways, it should make
our work easier. We need to know what the interests and priorities of each party
are so we can help them formulate mutually beneficial agreements. We do this by
supporting the parties in their search for trades (across issues they value
differently) that produce outcomes better for all sides than their BATNAs.
4.
Finally, we need
to be sure that our clients understand that our job is not to get anyone to
change their beliefs or change their mind.
We try to help parties reach mutually advantageous agreements in spite
of their differences. We do not allow
our own point of view or our own preferences to intrudce.
Harmonizing Interests through dialogue vs. assisted problem-solving
A segment of the ADR
profession has been moving in the direction of facilitating dialogue. Indeed,
there are many who think we should devote a substantial portion of our time to
helping Red and Blue (and others who have conflicting values) learn to talk with
and understand each other more effectively.
I’m personally not convinced that dialogue for its own sake should be a
high priority for the ADR profession. I
don’t think greater understanding is going to lead to harmonization of
conflicting values and interests.
Perhaps we can help people with diametrically opposed views hear each
other, but I’m not sure that’s as important as working out agreements in specific
contexts. I think we should emphasize
problem-solving -- generating “a workable peace” when some action needs to be
taken -- rather than devoting time to generating a deeper understanding of the
sources of disagreement. I don’t think
Red and Blue need to believe the same things to find ways of taking action.
The key is to convince as
many stakeholders as possible that there is a way to meet their interests in a
manner that will get them more than what no agreement (stalemate) guarantees, and
more than they are likely to get if they continue to battle.
Coming back to neutrality
As I have already said, we
must be absolutely diligent about maintaining our neutrality – no matter how
strongly we feel personally – if we want to make a case for the value we add. I’m
convinced that the way we act in our personal lives may shape how we are
perceived in our professional roles. While each of us has opportunities to take
direct political action in our personal lives, remember that if you sign a
petition, march peacefully, write op eds, or lobby for your point of view,
there is no way anyone on the other side will accept you as a dispute resolution
professional they can trust. We need to think very carefully about how we carry
ourselves in public. I promise you that whatever actions we take in our
personal lives will be noted. Being perceived as neutrals in the Age of Trump
is, in my view, the key to contributing to conflict resolution in these
difficult times.
[Based on the keynote presentation I made to the Biennial
Conference of the New England Association for Conflict Resolution (NEACR) in
Waltham, Massachusetts on 9/8/17.]
Posted by Lawrence Susskind at 10:23 AM 0 comments
Labels: consensus building, NE-ACR, neutrality, role of ADR professionals, The Age of Trump
Tuesday, May 12, 2015
Evaluating a Consensus Building Effort
I worry a lot about how to evaluate the success or failure of consensus building efforts in which I get involved. When I try to convince someone in a position of responsibility to commit to consensus building, I need to tell them how they'll be able to gauge the results. Assume, for example, that I a am able to persuade a public official to (1) spend $50,000, and (2) require agency staff (as well as more than a dozen non-governmental participants) to commit the equivalent of one day a week for several months trying to reach agreement about when, whether and how to proceed with a controversial project. If the project is going to cost several million dollars -- and generate tax revenues for the city for many decades to come -- it is easy to point out that $50,000 is a small price to pay for ensuring broad-gauged public support, especially if the group is able to reach an agreement among all (or nearly all) the participants. But that's not a sufficient measure of success, is it?
And, what if the agreement is not unanimous? Someone opposed to a project now supported by a larger group may have a harder time blocking implementation (and pursuing their own interests). From that person's standpoint, a nearly-unanimous agreement is not a good thing. And, what if the agreed upon version of the project is going to cost the city a lot more than the original proposal? Without a consensus building effort, the project might still have gone ahead, albeit with only lukewarm support from some of the stakeholders. To get agreement (which is still worth it to the city), local government might be required to pony up additional resources. Someone whose best interests are served by blocking any and every version of the project and for whom no amount of compensation of any kind would justify their support will feel that nearly unanimous agreement is a bad outcome. .
More specifically, here are the three questions I ask myself when I try to evaluate the success or failure of a consensus building effort: Was agreement reached (and did the agreement meet the interests of all or almost all the stakeholders)? How does the agreement compare -- in terms of the fairness, efficiency, stability and wisdom of the choices that were made -- to what the parties would probably have been forced to accept? And, are there spillover effects of the agreement and the consensus building process that should be taken into account in my overall assessment of the results?
Agreement Reached?
If all the parties support the agreement; that is, if they believe there interests are well met; I would probably say the process is a success. Of course, the agreement must be reached without spending an exorbitant amount of time or money. And, the parties had to have a pretty good idea when they came to the table of what their interests and walk-away options looked like. If the process brings some people to their senses or helps them clarify their priorities and their walk-away alternatives, that, too is a measure of success -- even if no agreement is reached.
Sometimes one or more parties will oppose an agreement even though everyone else is happy with it. Since most consensus building efforts do not commitment to unanimity, I might still judge the outcome a success. It may be, the rest of the group ganged up one party -- an outlier whose interests are diametrically opposed to everyone else's. On the other hand, assuming the rest of the group has made a good faith effort to meet the interests of the one left out, I would probably say the process was a success. the exception, though, is when the one left out holds the key to moving forward (i.e. the developer who is financing the project). Then, if an agreement can not be implemented, the process is clearly not a success.
So, the extent to which the parties feel that the consensus building process helped them reach an agreement that meets their interests is a key to the success of the effort. If the agreement is not unanimous, it might still be successful as long as the group makes a good faith effort to meet the interests of the one left out. And, if the outlier was seeking primarily to play a spoiler role, everyone else may judge their agreement a huge success. If the process helped the parties recalculate their priorities and check the reasonableness of their expectations, even if no agreement is reached, I might still say the process was a success. No agreement is sometimes the right outcome, especially if there is no "solution space" in light of party's next best option.
As Compared to What?
Even if the group reaches agreement, we still need to consider the fairness, efficiency, stability and wisdom of what they have worked out. In my book Breaking the Impasse (Basic Books, 1985) I explore each of these criteria in more detail. If an agreement is reached by papering over fundamental differences, the desired results may not be achieved, even if the strict terms of the agreement are implemented. My Dutch friends call this "a thin ice agreement." If the participants were tired, and agreed to something contrary to their interests, they'll reneg and implementation will fail. Sometimes the parties agree to endorse to something without checking back with their constituents (i.e. their back tables). The agreement may well fall apart in such cases. Furthermore, circumstances may change during implementation. If the parties fail to consider important contingencies (and structure their agreement accordingly), whatever they are hoping to achieve won't happen. So, we can say, in retrospect, that an agreement wasn't wise (even if we can't say that at the point at which it is signed). Judging whether an agreement (and the process leading up to it) is fair, efficient, stable and wise requires the passage of time. Looking back, it might be obvious that the parties ignored or misread information readily available to them. These are all situations in which agreement, in and of itself, is not a sufficient measure of success.
Spillover Effects?
The assessment of any consensus building process hinges, in part, on the goals the parties set for themselves at the outset. In the midst of a hopeless deadlock, stakeholders might set as their goals rebuilding trust and generating a few good ideas (that might give root to longer term solutions). So, a process could be successful even if an agreement is not reached. It all depends on the goals of the participants. If an agreement is reached, but in the process relationships are undermined; for example, it turns out someone didn't negotiate in good faith and that become clear only after an agreement was reached, I might judge the process a failure. I also want a consensus building effort to make it easier for the parties to deal with each other in the future. I want to help build trust, increase empathy and enhance appreciation for the views of others. I want to help the parties internalize the ground rules essential to joint problem-solving. If all of these things don't happen, even if agreement is reached, I might decide that the process failed.
In Sum
Its hard to answer the three questions with which I began. Moreover, the answers may vary depending on who you ask. Averaging the results (across all stakeholders) just muddies the result. Aggregating across the participants hides what could be serious adverse effects on the least powerful or the least articulate stakeholder. On the other hand, netting out the results in a way that assumes that each participant must achieve a result that at least equals what they would have gotten if there had been no consensus building effort, is probably a reasonable way to gauge the outcome. I also try to incorporate an assessment of what the participants learned (about each other and how to participate in such a consensus building process). If I can say that everyone got at least what they would have achieved without the consensus building effort -- and some got more -- while some (or most) of the participants felt they learned how to advance their interests more effectively in the future, then I would say a consensus building effort was successful.
And, what if the agreement is not unanimous? Someone opposed to a project now supported by a larger group may have a harder time blocking implementation (and pursuing their own interests). From that person's standpoint, a nearly-unanimous agreement is not a good thing. And, what if the agreed upon version of the project is going to cost the city a lot more than the original proposal? Without a consensus building effort, the project might still have gone ahead, albeit with only lukewarm support from some of the stakeholders. To get agreement (which is still worth it to the city), local government might be required to pony up additional resources. Someone whose best interests are served by blocking any and every version of the project and for whom no amount of compensation of any kind would justify their support will feel that nearly unanimous agreement is a bad outcome. .
More specifically, here are the three questions I ask myself when I try to evaluate the success or failure of a consensus building effort: Was agreement reached (and did the agreement meet the interests of all or almost all the stakeholders)? How does the agreement compare -- in terms of the fairness, efficiency, stability and wisdom of the choices that were made -- to what the parties would probably have been forced to accept? And, are there spillover effects of the agreement and the consensus building process that should be taken into account in my overall assessment of the results?
Agreement Reached?
If all the parties support the agreement; that is, if they believe there interests are well met; I would probably say the process is a success. Of course, the agreement must be reached without spending an exorbitant amount of time or money. And, the parties had to have a pretty good idea when they came to the table of what their interests and walk-away options looked like. If the process brings some people to their senses or helps them clarify their priorities and their walk-away alternatives, that, too is a measure of success -- even if no agreement is reached.
Sometimes one or more parties will oppose an agreement even though everyone else is happy with it. Since most consensus building efforts do not commitment to unanimity, I might still judge the outcome a success. It may be, the rest of the group ganged up one party -- an outlier whose interests are diametrically opposed to everyone else's. On the other hand, assuming the rest of the group has made a good faith effort to meet the interests of the one left out, I would probably say the process was a success. the exception, though, is when the one left out holds the key to moving forward (i.e. the developer who is financing the project). Then, if an agreement can not be implemented, the process is clearly not a success.
So, the extent to which the parties feel that the consensus building process helped them reach an agreement that meets their interests is a key to the success of the effort. If the agreement is not unanimous, it might still be successful as long as the group makes a good faith effort to meet the interests of the one left out. And, if the outlier was seeking primarily to play a spoiler role, everyone else may judge their agreement a huge success. If the process helped the parties recalculate their priorities and check the reasonableness of their expectations, even if no agreement is reached, I might still say the process was a success. No agreement is sometimes the right outcome, especially if there is no "solution space" in light of party's next best option.
As Compared to What?
Even if the group reaches agreement, we still need to consider the fairness, efficiency, stability and wisdom of what they have worked out. In my book Breaking the Impasse (Basic Books, 1985) I explore each of these criteria in more detail. If an agreement is reached by papering over fundamental differences, the desired results may not be achieved, even if the strict terms of the agreement are implemented. My Dutch friends call this "a thin ice agreement." If the participants were tired, and agreed to something contrary to their interests, they'll reneg and implementation will fail. Sometimes the parties agree to endorse to something without checking back with their constituents (i.e. their back tables). The agreement may well fall apart in such cases. Furthermore, circumstances may change during implementation. If the parties fail to consider important contingencies (and structure their agreement accordingly), whatever they are hoping to achieve won't happen. So, we can say, in retrospect, that an agreement wasn't wise (even if we can't say that at the point at which it is signed). Judging whether an agreement (and the process leading up to it) is fair, efficient, stable and wise requires the passage of time. Looking back, it might be obvious that the parties ignored or misread information readily available to them. These are all situations in which agreement, in and of itself, is not a sufficient measure of success.
Spillover Effects?
The assessment of any consensus building process hinges, in part, on the goals the parties set for themselves at the outset. In the midst of a hopeless deadlock, stakeholders might set as their goals rebuilding trust and generating a few good ideas (that might give root to longer term solutions). So, a process could be successful even if an agreement is not reached. It all depends on the goals of the participants. If an agreement is reached, but in the process relationships are undermined; for example, it turns out someone didn't negotiate in good faith and that become clear only after an agreement was reached, I might judge the process a failure. I also want a consensus building effort to make it easier for the parties to deal with each other in the future. I want to help build trust, increase empathy and enhance appreciation for the views of others. I want to help the parties internalize the ground rules essential to joint problem-solving. If all of these things don't happen, even if agreement is reached, I might decide that the process failed.
In Sum
Its hard to answer the three questions with which I began. Moreover, the answers may vary depending on who you ask. Averaging the results (across all stakeholders) just muddies the result. Aggregating across the participants hides what could be serious adverse effects on the least powerful or the least articulate stakeholder. On the other hand, netting out the results in a way that assumes that each participant must achieve a result that at least equals what they would have gotten if there had been no consensus building effort, is probably a reasonable way to gauge the outcome. I also try to incorporate an assessment of what the participants learned (about each other and how to participate in such a consensus building process). If I can say that everyone got at least what they would have achieved without the consensus building effort -- and some got more -- while some (or most) of the participants felt they learned how to advance their interests more effectively in the future, then I would say a consensus building effort was successful.
Posted by Lawrence Susskind at 3:23 PM 0 comments
Labels: consensus building, efficiency, evaluating a consensus building process, gauging the fairness, stability and wisdom of a consensus building outcome
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