Monday, December 28, 2015
Successful Entrepreneurs Must Learn to Negotiate
If you can’t negotiate, you can’t be a successful entrepreneur.
My new online class at MIT is designed to help both new and experienced entrepreneurs
improve their negotiation skills. This includes learning how to handle the four
unique features of entrepreneurial negotiation.
Harvard Business School Professor Howard Stevenson had it
right when he said that entrepreneurship is “the pursuit of opportunity beyond
resources controlled.” That means that no matter what the sector, entrepreneurship
requires convincing others—start-up co-founders, angel investors, venture
capitalists, employees, and potential business partners —to commit their
knowledge, time, reputation, expertise, and money to your idea. You’ve got to
convince them it’s in their interest to do what you want, when you want, the
way you want. And, you also have to be able to listen and improvise so you can refine,
or even overhaul, your ideas in light of others’ needs and contributions.
These are learnable skills. Studies and experience show that
people can get better at negotiation, no matter what their underlying style or background.
Self-confidence has nothing to do with it, either. Empirically, confidence is a
terrible predictor of one’s negotiation ability. So, if you think you can’t negotiate,
don’t be discouraged. And if you think you’re a negotiation genius, don’t be so
sure.
My new online MIT Professional Education course, Entrepreneurial
Negotiation: The MIT Way, is designed to teach dealmaking skills to people
working in start-ups or other entrepreneurial settings. It focuses on the unique
features of entrepreneurial deal-making: the importance of ego and emotion; technical
complexity; uncertainty; and the
need to build and maintain relationships.
Most simple buy/sell negotiations don’t always these factors; most
entrepreneurial endeavors do.
My online negotiation course is like no other. It teaches
negotiation through the use of role-play simulations developed by the Program
on Negotiation at Harvard Law School (which I co-founded, and where I have
taught executives and students for many years). These sims allow participants
to practice the skills they’re learning, and discuss what worked and what they
could have done differently. The course also includes video of real people
negotiating, and shows me giving them coaching advice using video-recorded
highlights of their efforts. The course provides opportunities for students to
put their learning into action by writing short (two-page) response papers that
other students in the class read and grade using an assigned template.
It is not possible to learn negotiation skills without
practicing. And, it is best to practice with someone you can talk to
afterwards. So, everyone who registers is urged to have a buddy register with
them, so that they can complete four face-to-face practice negotiations.
For those who can’t co-register with a
buddy, we have other ways to help you practice.
The course focuses on the four unique features of
entrepreneurial negotiations:
(1) Ego and Emotion
Anyone who invents or creates something tends to become
attached to it—maybe even a little protective or defensive about it. After all,
they’re proud of what they produced—which they understand better than anyone—and
have their own ideas about the best way to proceed. They are likely to get
upset if someone else even appears to downplay its value. Entrepreneurial negotiations,
therefore, almost always involve some degree of defensiveness on the part of
the proposer or creator. On the other side, negotiation counterparts, such an
investors, tend to have a healthy skepticism about the claims any inventor is
making. After all, a large percentage of all new businesses and new ideas fail.
Put these two together, and talks are likely to be delicate, perhaps even
escalating into increasingly bold claims and deeper skepticism. Such
interactions can lead to bruised egos.
Why does this happen? Psychologist Lee Ross at UCLA has identified
an important cognitive bias that applies in these situations—reactive devaluation. It causes all of
us to automatically question the legitimacy of anything proposed by a negotiating
partner. An inventor is inclined to mistrust the statements made by the other
side about his or her invention. While investors or business partners almost
always start out skeptical about the claims made by an inventor.
There are a number of strategies and techniques that can be
used to counteract important emotional and cognitive dynamics like reactive
devaluation. Entrepreneurial Negotiation: The MIT Way gives budding entrepreneurs
a chance to learn and practice these deal-saving techniques.
(2) Technical Complexity
Many start-ups are built around a technical insight or
design. These may involve innovative hardware or software, or a complicated new
application of old tools to solve a tricky problem, or capture an untapped
market segment. Despite plenty of exceptions, potential investors or business partners
rarely have the same specialized expertise as the inventors with whom they are
negotiating. That’s why investors often rely on experts of their own to test
and vet whatever is being proposed. Asymmetries in technical understanding and
the involvement of skeptical experts working for the other side can create difficulties.
For example, experts selected by an investor or potential business
partner may represent a particular school of thought on a technical matter that
causes them to be skeptical of what is being proposed. When this happens, the
inventor has to work especially hard to win over the other side’s expert. Moreover,
even in the face of a great idea, an investor’s technical expert might remain
skeptical, just to prove his or her worth, reflecting more of a bias than an objective
evaluation of whatever is being proposed. In such situations, the entrepreneur
will end up negotiating not only with the investor but also, indirectly, with what we call the investor’s or
partner’s “back table.”
To negotiate with a back table (even indirectly), entrepreneurs
have to find a way to make sure claims about their product or service, based on
technical or scientific tests they have done themselves, are convincing. They
know the strengths and weaknesses of the tests inside and out. Unfortunately,
given typical negotiation dynamics, their results may fail to persuade a back
table for the reasons mentioned above. Entrepreneurial
Negotiation: The MIT Way teaches “joint fact-finding” – a technique for overcoming
this problem.
(3) Uncertainty
Entrepreneurship turns on innovation, and innovation is ripe
with uncertainty. The usual argument in favor of something innovative is that
no one has ever tried it before. The argument against it is also that no one
has ever tried it before. All this uncertainty creates both risk and
opportunity. Both are magnified by technical complexity in fast-changing markets
and shifting business environments.
Especially at a start-up, reasonable minds can disagree
about how to manage uncertainty. Experimentation and creativity help, of
course. But in negotiations, investors and entrepreneurs sometimes turn to
another tool to resolve their different estimates of what is likely to happen. Instead of trying to negotiate agreements based
on whose forecast is more likely to be correct—e.g., how fast the user base
will grow, how soon the company will become profitable, when the next round of
funding might arrive, how fast the company can scale up its presence or
production—the parties can use “contingent agreements.” These bridge competing forecasts
by spelling out what both sides agree should happen regardless of which scenario
is correct. In Entrepreneurial Negotiation: The MIT Way, I examine the best ways
of using contingent agreements as a hedge against uncertainty.
(4) Relationships
At the conclusion of many buy-sell negotiations, the parties
are glad they never have to see each other again. Entrepreneurial negotiations,
on the other hand, often require ongoing relationships. Managers need to keep
talking to their board of directors; founders need to talk to venture
capitalists more than just once. Once they have worked together for a while, they
may part company; until then, though, they are best off behaving as if they
will have to continue to work together.
There are several ways negotiators should and should not behave
when they anticipate the possibility of long-term interactions with their
negotiating partners. First, long-term working relationships hinge on trust,
and trust depends on truthfulness. My course explores the differences between the
kind of bluffing that’s seen as appropriate in many negotiating contexts, and
the kind of deceit that sours relationships. Second, when relationships matter,
negotiators should avoid win-lose deals that eventually leave one side realizing
they didn’t get a fair shake. The alternative is a win-win outcome that
benefits everyone, at least one that leaves all parties better off than they
would be with any other available deal. This is more if both sides commit to creating
enough value to go around. Entrepreneurial Negotiation: The MIT Way
explains how to create value through win-win trades that build trust and sustain
relationships.
The MIT Way
To be a good negotiator, you need more than mere tactics and
technique. You need a theory, one that explains why you should do some things
and not others. MIT’s motto (“Mens et manus”) is Latin for mind and hand—theory
and practice, why and how. Any good entrepreneurial negotiator must know what
to do and how to do it. Without adequate theory, you won’t know how to
improvise or apply what you know in new situations. Without adequate technique, you won’t be able
to pull it off. The MIT way is to learn the theory of negotiation (that has
developed in academic and business settings over the past several decades) try
it out, and then formulate a personal approach to entrepreneurial negotiation
that integrates both the why and the how.
The text for the MIT course is Good For You, Great for Me: Finding the Trading Zone and Winning at Win-Win Negotiation. Those who enroll get a free
electronic copy.
Posted by Lawrence Susskind at 10:13 PM 3 comments
Labels: angel, angels, board of directors, boards, complexity, ego, entrepreneur, founder, MIT, MIT way, negotiation, professional education, relationships, start up, start-up, startup, uncertainty, VC, VCs, venture capital
Thursday, August 13, 2015
The Effects of Climate Change Are All Local: Here's What You Can Do to Help Manage the Risks
We've spent far too much time thinking about the
global causes of climate change, and not nearly enough worrying about the local
impacts that climate change is already having on coastal communities. The
distinction is important. Most of the people pushing for reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions are environmentalists or experts worried about future
generations. But there is a very immediate constituency – the people being hit
with higher costs for insurance, water and electricity, and those facing
substantial property losses or a drop in business income today because of
increased flooding and water shortages. People who live in a coastal community
or on a river nearly anywhere in the world are a lot more worried about what's
happening right now, than what might happen to future generations
if we don't limit greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S., China, India and
elsewhere. Climate change means too much water or not enough water in the
wrong place at the wrong time! It means deadly heat waves. It means radical
changes in natural places, animal and plant life and the onset of new
diseases.
Our new book, Managing Climate Risks in
Coastal Communities: Readiness, Engagement and Adaptation (by Lawrence
Susskind, Danya Rumore, Carri Hulet and Patrick Field) is about to be published
by Anthem Press. It tells the story of four coastal communities trying to take climate
change-related risks seriously. What they are doing -- and what we have helped
them learn from their efforts -- can help other cities and towns fast-forward
the adoption of climate risk management measures that everyone agrees on. Here's
what these four communities in New England have done:
1. WHAT WE DID:
The “we” in this story is the New England Climate Adaptation Project
(NECAP), a partnership based at the MIT Science Impact Collaborative and the
not-for-profit Consensus Building Institute. Our close partners included the
National Estuarian Research Reserve System, the University of New Hampshire,
and four New England coastal communities. We prepared four Stakeholder
Assessments—one for each partner town in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New
Hampshire and Maine. These involved interviews with several dozen officials,
activists, business leaders and scientists. The scientists on our team prepared
a local climate change forecast (estimating likely temperature, precipitation
and sea level changes in the near term, mid-term and long-term) using downscaled regional
climate models and long-term data from local meteorological measuring stations.
With all this information in hand, we developed tailored role-play simulation
(RPSs). These are "serious games" that ask participants to imagine
that they are working in a community a lot like their own, trying to figure out
what to do about possible climate risks. We organized several workshops in each
of our four partner communities at which more than 100 - 150 people played the
games in each place. Workshops were co-sponsored by a wide range of local environmental,
business and public service organizations. The press attended. We
used social media to generate as much interest as we could.
2. WHAT WE WANTED TO LEARN: We wanted to know if this approach to
enhancing community readiness to address climate-related risks works. Does it
give people a better understanding of the problems they face, the options open
to them, the reasons that experts and locals think differently about what is
happening and what ought to be done, and the costs of taking different actions? Does this approach to public engagement build
capacity and political momentum? Does it change anyone's mind? Does it legitimize the search for immediate
"no regrets" actions as far as public spending is concerned?
Does it help the community see why adaptation is a local (not a state or
a federal) problem? To answer these
questions, we used independent town-wide polling to establish a base line of
public attitudes about climate change before and after the workshops, surveying
more than 500 people. We held intensive debriefings with all participants at
the end of each workshop. We interviewed almost 25% of the participants 4 - 6
weeks later to see what they remembered. We did statistical analyses of
the results across demographic groups within each community, between those who
participated in workshops and those who didn't, and then compared the four communities
in the four states. We prepared detailed Case Studies summarizing what we
learned in each town. In the book, we summarize all of our findings.
3. RESULTS: A simple, but tailored one-hour game with
a 30-minute debriefing can change minds
with regard to the importance of climate change, the nature of climate risks, and
the need for local action. People
from almost all groups (except those so convinced that climate change is not a
problem that they refused to participate) learned about the science involved, increased their sense
that local governments need to act
and became more optimistic that people
in their community could and should act together to manage climate risks. Public
officials and staff felt more empowered to take action in their respective
spheres (public works, emergency response, health services, etc.) after seeing people’s
hearts and minds change at the workshops.
4. WHAT COMMUNITIES CAN DO. Communities facing climate change-related
risks have a few different options: they can do nothing and
hope for the best. They can invest in emergency preparedness so they are better able to respond and
recover from crises. They can "retreat" from the most
vulnerable areas. They can try to defend themselves by building protective infrastructure and adopting
new policies, such as land use regulations and building codes. They can mix and match elements of each
of these strategies. Whatever they decide, they will need widespread
support because it will take public and private cooperation and a continuous,
not a one shot, effort to bring all but one of these options to fruition.
Individual landowners, businesses, environmental activists, public agencies and
taxpayer groups will have to work together.
5. WHAT WE LEARNED: Above all, communities must
enhance their level of readiness if they expect to address climate risks. They
will have to provide opportunities for widespread public involvement in
something other than a few "town hall" meetings at which pre-packaged
information is handed out and people are lectured at. They will have toh help
taxpayers understand that there are "no regrets” moves they can make to reduce
climate risks while simultaneously accomplishing other important objectives at
the same time. For example, using this year's open space preservation money to
create natural barriers along the shore can provide storm protection for
private property owners, reduce saltwater intrusion into freshwater wetlands
(protecting underground water supplies), armor waste disposal and electricity
infrastructure, and minimize flood risks.
6. OUR TAKEAWAY:
The sooner the U.S. shifts its focus to reducing local vulnerability to climate
risks (so that everyone can see what the costs are going to be year after year
as climate change accelerates), the sooner there will be more of a political
constituency that wants to get at the source of the problem. So, unlike many who
worry that any talk of adaptation detracts from global efforts to push for
mitigation (i.e. reduction in greenhouse gases), we take just the opposite
view. We think the political pressure for mitigation is not strong enough
to push for a global action plan or new US laws because people don’t recognize
the costs to them today. Now is the time to highlight what it’s going to take
to help vast numbers of coastal and riverine communities all over the world avoid
paying immense costs just to survive in the years ahead. When they see
what it really costs to manage climate risks, we believe they will care much
more about the underlying cause, and quickly become the missing constituency
needed to push for global emissions reducing policies.
6. WHAT CAN YOU DO? Get your community to play
the serious games we have developed (or look for a range of local partners that
will help adapt the games to your local conditions). Do a simple, anonymous
assessment to understand what everyone's real views are at present on issues of
climate change (you might be surprised!). Use our before-and-after
surveys to document the shifts that occur once people start attending workshops
and playing the right games. Get local officials and community activists
to be the first to play the games and talk about what the results suggest for
your community. Involve the local media in reporting the story. Adopt a
consensus building approach to formulating a collective risk management plan
for the community. Don't wait for extensive state or federal direction -- it's
probably not coming anytime soon. Emphasize the search for no-regret options --
things you can do right away that are good for multiple reasons AND will reduce
your community's vulnerability to sudden climate change.
You can order our book
from Amazon. You can learn more at scienceimpact.mit.edu.
Posted by Lawrence Susskind at 4:01 PM 0 comments
Labels: Anthem Press, CBI, climate adaptation, climate change, climate risk, collective risk management, MIT Science Impact Collaborative, New England, Role play simulations (RPS)
Sunday, June 7, 2015
It's the Process, Stupid!
For part of every year, I live in the most libertarian state in America. My family and I have spent our summers and winter vacations in the same small cabin on a lake for more than 25 years. The town we live in has about 1350 residents (about 900 of whom are 18 or older). It spreads out over about 30 square miles. There is a state road running through the town that is zoned for commercial use; otherwise, the town, in its master plan has chosen to ban heavy industry (particularly oil and gas distribution centers and junk yards). So, the town doesn't offer many jobs and most people commute to work. The several lakes in the town and beautiful New England setting attract a lot of out-of-towners and vacationers. Right now, the residents are up-in-arms because the town has approved construction of an oil and gas distribution center in the commercial zone. The site in question is in a 100 year flood zone, in a wetland and over an aquifer recharge area.
The story of how the project was approved is worth telling because it underscores, even in a state that is strongly anti-government, that people don't like it when someone, however well established in town, plays fast and loose with the rules of the game. The landowner of the site got himself appointed head of the local Zoning Board. The Board heard the applicant's request for a zoning variance (making an exception and allowing heavy industry in a commercial zone) at a meeting when the public was not present. (The public wasn't present because notice of the meeting was placed in a newspaper in the state capital 30 miles away. Less than 1% of the town subscribes to that paper.) At the meeting, the chair of the Board stepped down for a few minutes, recused himself, walked around to the other side of the microphone and presented his request for a variance. During the discussion (with no legal counsel present), he advised his fellow Board members that they were empowered to grant the variance, and that's what they did. Almost all were newly appointed. (One member, in private conversation, indicated that he felt pressured to go along.) The minutes of the meeting (again, which almost nobody knew about) were not posted in the town hall until AFTER the 30 day period for a legal appeal of the variance had passed.
Next, the site plan for the new oil and gas distribution center went to the Planning Board. The Planning Board held an extended public hearing that stretched over several evenings and several weeks. The professionals hired by the applicant offered a detailed site plan. Strong concern was registered by nearby residents (who had not received any notice of the request for the zoning variance because the land owner kept a small strip of land between the proposed project (which was now in the the hands of the oil and gas company) and the neighbors. Thus, technically, they were not abutters. The way the Planning Board operates in this state, since it made up of citizen volunteers and has no professional staff of its own, is to rely on what the applicant submits. When concerned citizens pointed out that even a small leak could spill across the road into the nearby brook and contaminate two of the lakes in the town, the applicant's engineer assured the Planning Board that the containment plan they had in mind wouldn't allow this to happen. When residents complained that
the whole facility was in violation of the town master plan (which clearly excludes heavy industry), the applicant's lawyer pointed out that the Zoning Board had granted them a variance. When residents raised concerns that the volunteer fire department did not have the necessary equipment or training to deal with a propane or fuel oil fire, the specialist hired by the applicant explained that their leak detection and containment system would head off any such problems. The Planning Board didn't buy this, so the applicant offered to pay for new equipment and training for the local fire department. When other critics of the project pointed to sink holes that had already formed on the site (because so much of the soil was disturbed when the site was excavated and regraded), the applicant's engineers said they would put the tanks on concrete pads. When still others pointed out that the site is in a seismically-active area and the pads (and tanks) might crack, the engineer said that they weren't required to make the facility earthquake-proof.
The town by-law only requires a drainage plan sufficient to deal with a 10 year flood. An engineer hired by concerned "abutters" said that a 100 year flood analysis would make more sense. When citizens at the hearing pointed out that very large tanker trucks would be heading to the site at least three times a day and turning off a highway (with a 55 mile an hour speed limit and a passing lane coming from the other direction), the applicant said that they had already received approval from the state highway department. When neighbors asked for trees to hide the tanks from the highway, the project developer indicated, at first, that wouldn't be possible because the police and fire chiefs needed to be able to see the tanks from the road to ensure security. (They later backed off this claim and agreed to add a visual barrier.) When residents asked that the Planning Board require the site owner to carry insurance sufficient to cover any and all costs of accidents and leaks, the Planning Board claimed that it was not empowered to do this. The back-and-forth continued for many hours. Some residents had done their homework and discovered that the applicant had similar facilities at several other sites that had been the target of state and federal enforcement actions. The Planning Board ruled such comments out of order, claiming they were only entitled to look at the details of the site plan. Eventually, the Planning Board was caught in the middle between friends of the applicant and angry opponents. The town Board of Selectmen indicated that there was nothing they could do because the project was in the hands of the Zoning Board and the Planning Board.
It took only a few weeks for a petition to the state Attorney General asking for an investigation to gain almost 300 signatures (about 1/3 of the adults in town). The Attorney General, though, will probably find that the Zoning Board followed the letter of law. It seems the rules regarding public notice and recusal of officials are pretty vague. The Planning Board's final approval is likely to be tied up in court for the next several years. How is it possible for a Planning Board to protect the public health, safety and welfare (to say nothing of the ecosystems involved) if it has no independent environmental impact assessment or risk assessment to work from, even for one of the riskiest projects in the town's recent history? How can it be OK for a landowner to take his request for a project that is clearly barred by the town master plan (as well as by a plebiscite when the master plan was updated) to a Board that he heads? How is it possible for public notice requirements to permit no notice to nearby landowners and no posting of the minutes of a Board meeting within the period in which residents are allowed to appeal such a decision?
What's interesting is that signs have started to sprout all over town saying "No Tanks." Residents in this libertarian state are looking to their local officials to "do something" about the threat posed by the project. Other commercial interests along the state road are worried that heavy industry in the commercial zone may pose risks to them and adversely affects the business climate. The state-wide daily newspaper has begun to cover the story, indicating that such manipulation of local boards is not in the best interests of the state. Even if the courts uphold both the Zoning and Planning Board decisions, residents won't forget what happened. I doubt the oil and gas distribution company will have very many local customers. In the end, even if the letter of the law is followed, but the spirt of the law and basic fairness to neighbors are violated, everybody loses. Opponents will face ongoing and unnecessary risks (and loss of property values), while proponents will besmirch their good name, lose market share, set a troublesome precedent and face extended legal fees.
Better for local governments, even in a libertarian state, to set and follow clearer and more sensible ground rules. And then, everyone needs to abide by the process.
The story of how the project was approved is worth telling because it underscores, even in a state that is strongly anti-government, that people don't like it when someone, however well established in town, plays fast and loose with the rules of the game. The landowner of the site got himself appointed head of the local Zoning Board. The Board heard the applicant's request for a zoning variance (making an exception and allowing heavy industry in a commercial zone) at a meeting when the public was not present. (The public wasn't present because notice of the meeting was placed in a newspaper in the state capital 30 miles away. Less than 1% of the town subscribes to that paper.) At the meeting, the chair of the Board stepped down for a few minutes, recused himself, walked around to the other side of the microphone and presented his request for a variance. During the discussion (with no legal counsel present), he advised his fellow Board members that they were empowered to grant the variance, and that's what they did. Almost all were newly appointed. (One member, in private conversation, indicated that he felt pressured to go along.) The minutes of the meeting (again, which almost nobody knew about) were not posted in the town hall until AFTER the 30 day period for a legal appeal of the variance had passed.
Next, the site plan for the new oil and gas distribution center went to the Planning Board. The Planning Board held an extended public hearing that stretched over several evenings and several weeks. The professionals hired by the applicant offered a detailed site plan. Strong concern was registered by nearby residents (who had not received any notice of the request for the zoning variance because the land owner kept a small strip of land between the proposed project (which was now in the the hands of the oil and gas company) and the neighbors. Thus, technically, they were not abutters. The way the Planning Board operates in this state, since it made up of citizen volunteers and has no professional staff of its own, is to rely on what the applicant submits. When concerned citizens pointed out that even a small leak could spill across the road into the nearby brook and contaminate two of the lakes in the town, the applicant's engineer assured the Planning Board that the containment plan they had in mind wouldn't allow this to happen. When residents complained that
the whole facility was in violation of the town master plan (which clearly excludes heavy industry), the applicant's lawyer pointed out that the Zoning Board had granted them a variance. When residents raised concerns that the volunteer fire department did not have the necessary equipment or training to deal with a propane or fuel oil fire, the specialist hired by the applicant explained that their leak detection and containment system would head off any such problems. The Planning Board didn't buy this, so the applicant offered to pay for new equipment and training for the local fire department. When other critics of the project pointed to sink holes that had already formed on the site (because so much of the soil was disturbed when the site was excavated and regraded), the applicant's engineers said they would put the tanks on concrete pads. When still others pointed out that the site is in a seismically-active area and the pads (and tanks) might crack, the engineer said that they weren't required to make the facility earthquake-proof.
The town by-law only requires a drainage plan sufficient to deal with a 10 year flood. An engineer hired by concerned "abutters" said that a 100 year flood analysis would make more sense. When citizens at the hearing pointed out that very large tanker trucks would be heading to the site at least three times a day and turning off a highway (with a 55 mile an hour speed limit and a passing lane coming from the other direction), the applicant said that they had already received approval from the state highway department. When neighbors asked for trees to hide the tanks from the highway, the project developer indicated, at first, that wouldn't be possible because the police and fire chiefs needed to be able to see the tanks from the road to ensure security. (They later backed off this claim and agreed to add a visual barrier.) When residents asked that the Planning Board require the site owner to carry insurance sufficient to cover any and all costs of accidents and leaks, the Planning Board claimed that it was not empowered to do this. The back-and-forth continued for many hours. Some residents had done their homework and discovered that the applicant had similar facilities at several other sites that had been the target of state and federal enforcement actions. The Planning Board ruled such comments out of order, claiming they were only entitled to look at the details of the site plan. Eventually, the Planning Board was caught in the middle between friends of the applicant and angry opponents. The town Board of Selectmen indicated that there was nothing they could do because the project was in the hands of the Zoning Board and the Planning Board.
It took only a few weeks for a petition to the state Attorney General asking for an investigation to gain almost 300 signatures (about 1/3 of the adults in town). The Attorney General, though, will probably find that the Zoning Board followed the letter of law. It seems the rules regarding public notice and recusal of officials are pretty vague. The Planning Board's final approval is likely to be tied up in court for the next several years. How is it possible for a Planning Board to protect the public health, safety and welfare (to say nothing of the ecosystems involved) if it has no independent environmental impact assessment or risk assessment to work from, even for one of the riskiest projects in the town's recent history? How can it be OK for a landowner to take his request for a project that is clearly barred by the town master plan (as well as by a plebiscite when the master plan was updated) to a Board that he heads? How is it possible for public notice requirements to permit no notice to nearby landowners and no posting of the minutes of a Board meeting within the period in which residents are allowed to appeal such a decision?
What's interesting is that signs have started to sprout all over town saying "No Tanks." Residents in this libertarian state are looking to their local officials to "do something" about the threat posed by the project. Other commercial interests along the state road are worried that heavy industry in the commercial zone may pose risks to them and adversely affects the business climate. The state-wide daily newspaper has begun to cover the story, indicating that such manipulation of local boards is not in the best interests of the state. Even if the courts uphold both the Zoning and Planning Board decisions, residents won't forget what happened. I doubt the oil and gas distribution company will have very many local customers. In the end, even if the letter of the law is followed, but the spirt of the law and basic fairness to neighbors are violated, everybody loses. Opponents will face ongoing and unnecessary risks (and loss of property values), while proponents will besmirch their good name, lose market share, set a troublesome precedent and face extended legal fees.
Better for local governments, even in a libertarian state, to set and follow clearer and more sensible ground rules. And then, everyone needs to abide by the process.
Posted by Lawrence Susskind at 9:27 AM 1 comments
Labels: Facility siting disputes, fair process, libertarian states, local government, zoning and planning boards
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